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THE FAMILY AUTOMOBILE AND THE FAMILY PURPOSE
DOCTRINE
Is the recognition and acceptance of the so-called "family-purpose"
doctrine merely an application to new facts of the recognized funda-
mental rules governing liability in the master-servant or principal-
agent relation, or does it represent "an advanced proposition in the
law of principal and agent" presenting "a case of such theoretical
and attenuated agency, if any, as would be beyond the recognition
of sound principles of law as they are ordinarily applied to that re-
lation?'' The issue is sharply drawn. In Jones v. Cook2 the
majority opinion declared: "The doctrine of agency is not con-
fined to merely commercial business transactions, but extends to cases
where the father maintains an automobile for family use, with a
general authority, expressed or implied, that it may be used for the
comfort, convenience, pleasure and entertainment or outdoor recrea-
tion of members of the owner's family. This view was also applied
in case of horse-drawn vehicles before the introduction of the automo-
bile. It is not a new graft on the law of agency. It is merely apply-
ing old principles to new conditions." But this decision, in the opin-
ion of the dissenting judge, "although sustained by an apparent
weight of authority, contravenes fundamental principles of the laws
of agency and master and servant and the rule respondeat superior."
In Arkin v. Page,3 the majority opinion gave expression to the follow-
ing: "It seems rather a fantastic notion that a son, in using the fam-
ily automobile to take a ride by himself for pure pleasure, is the agent
of his father in furnishing amusement for himself, is really carrying
on his father's business, and that his father, as principal, should bo'
liable for result of the son's negligent manner of furnishing the enter-
tainment to himself." But the two dissenting judges saw "nothing
fantastic in these statements of the relation between the owner of an
automobile furnished for general family use and a member of the
family operating it in the authorized use nor in the decision of many
courts to the same effect;" and they emphasized that "the relation
is not based upon the purpose which the parent has in mind in buying
the automobile but upon the authorized application to the family
use."
Naturally this conflict of opinion whicli is evidenced by dissenting
opinions within courts exists between courts. And not only is there
sharp conflict on the general doctrine but there is considerable diver-
' Van Blarkom v. Dodgson (1917) 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443, L. R. A.
1917F 363.
2 (1912), 90 West Va., 710, 111 S. E. 828.
3 (1919) 287 fI1. 420, 123 N. E. 30, 5 A. L. R. 216.
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gence in results between courts that accept the doctrine. This seems
to be due to a difference in interpretation of the phrase "father's
business." In Arkin v. Page, supra, the accident occurred while the
defendant's son was driving the automobile unaccompanied by any
member of his family and while he was on his way to make arrange-
ments to enroll in a school. In a later Illinois case, Graham v. P age,4
the car was being driven by the daughter of the defendant for the
purpose of taking a pair of her shoes to a shoe-repairing shop when
the accident took place. The court said that the daughter was engaged
in a "family errand" and was in effect acting for the father in the per-
formance of this "family errand," and that the father was responsible
for the manner in which his business,--i. & the family errand, was car-
ried on. The court insigted that the facts distinguished Graham v. Page
from the earlier case of Arkin v. Pake, but, judging from comments,
the court seems to be alone in finding any such difference as to justify
the application of a different rule of liability.
Some courts have refused to apply the family-purpose doctrine
when the driver is the only member of the defendant's family in the
vehicle. This distinction has been made by the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey. In Doran v. Thomsen" the facts disclosed that
the defendant's daughter, whose negligent driving caused the acci-
dent, took his automobile out for her own pleasure and the pleasure of
her three friends who accompanied her and that no other members of
the father's family were in the car. The court refused to recognize
defendant's liability under the family-purpose doctrine and the case
was thought to have repudiated the doctrine. In the later case of
Missel v. Hays6 the evidence showed that members of the defendant's
family, other than the driver, who was his son, were in the automobile
at the time of the accident. In comparing and distinguishing the
two cases the court said: "In the present case there exists a very
important fact (the absence of which was commented upon in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Voorhees speaking for this court in the Doran
case), which is that the automobile at the time of the accident was
occupied by the father's immediate family and their guests. This
fact constituted affirmative evidence that the automobile was being
used in the father's affairs or business. It was within the scope of
the father's business to furnish his wife and daughter who were liv-
ing with him as members of his immediate family, with outdoor re-
creation just the same as it was his business to furnish them with
food and clothing, or to minister to their health in other ways." The
court indicated that the father would not be liable if the facts should
show that the son had taken the automobile out primarily for his
own pleasure and convenience and had invited his mother and sister
4 (1921) 300 Ill. 40, 132 N. E. 817.
5 (1909 76 N. J. L. 754, 71 AtI. 296, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335.
6 (1914) 86 N. J. L. 348, 91 AtI. 322.
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to go along as his guests. But in Birch v. Abercombie7 the court,
refusing to make this distinction, stated its view in the following
language: "The fact that only one member of the family was in the
vehicle at the time is in no sense a differentiating circumstance, abro-
gating the agency. It was within the general purpose of the owner-
ship that any member of the family should use it, and the agency is
present in the use of it by one, as well as by all. In this there is no
similitude to a lending of a machine to another for such other's use
and purposes, unconnected with the general purpose for which the
machine was owned and kept." The same view is expressed in the
dissenting opinion in Arkin v. Page, supra,: "There is no possible
ground of difference concerning liability, whether there is one member
of the family in the automobile or the whole family. If it is within
the scope of a father's business to furnish members of his family with
an automobile for family use, just the same as it is his business to
furnish them with food and clothing, or to minister to their health in
other ways, it was just as much the business of the plaintiff in error
when his son drove the automobile for his convenience as if all the
family had been riding in it. The only ground upon which it can
be said that he was not liable for negligence in the operation of the
automobile would be that it was none of his affair."
The courts that accept and apply the doctrine deny any purpose,
or any need, of basing liability on the mere fact of ownership, and
they do not question that tort liability cannot be predicated upon
the fact of family relationship. On the other hand the courts that
reject the doctrine do not question the possibility of a master-servant
relation being created between the head of the family and a member
in respect to the use of the family automobile. For example: "In
other words we reject the so-called 'family-purpose' doctrine, as stated
by some of the courts in its broadest sense, though we do not mean
to hold that there may not be circumstances under which it would be
a question of fact for the jury to determine, whether the person so
operating the car was the agent of the head of the family, or was the
agent of the particular member or members of the family for whose
pleasure and benefit the car was then used." 8 However, the tendency
to leave the question to the jury called forth the caustic comment that
"some courts were inclined to get rid of the difficulty of resting lia-
bility on the one existing fact, ownership of the car, by declaring
that the question of 'agency' was one for the jury, a process known
in some quarters as 'passing the buck'. "9
Although the automobile is purchased by the father for the general
use of his family, nevertheless the father cannot be held for liability
7 (1913) 74 Wash. 493, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 59.
8 Norton v. Hall (1921) 149 Ark. 428, 232 S. W. 934, 19 A. L. R. 384. To
same effect, Smith v. Jordan 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761.
9 Watkins v. Clark (1918) 105 Kans. 629, 176 Pac. 131.
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where a member, against the father's command, has surreptitiously
taken the car and negligently injured another.10 This necessarily fol-
lows from the admittedly consensual character of the relation out
of which the liability arises.
In most cases in which the family-purpose doctrine has been in-
voked the father has been sued for the negligence of a son or daugh-
ter, but, for the purposes of the rule, it would seem that any member
of the family is the head who furnishes the automobile for the family
use, with authority expressed or implied to the other members to
use it as their customary conveyance, and the cases have so held in
respect to the husband and wife. But in the Minnesota case of
Morken v. St. PierrO the court questioned whether the family-pur-
pose doctrine should be extended to cases where the car is owned by
a son of the family. The court was not required to decide the ques-
tion, as the case went off on the point that the defendant was not shown
to have knowingly permitted members to use his car for their own
purposes.
If, in order to impose vicarious liability on the head of the family,
it is necessary to find the conventional characteristics of the typical
master-servant or principal-agent relation in the relation between the
head of the family and the driver of the automobile, then the family-
purpose doctrine does present a "case of theoretical and attenuated
agency." But the principle of vicarious liability as a part of our
legal system has not been confined in its operation to the modern
master-servant or principal-agent relation nor limited to its present
"attenuated" effects. The earliest rule of liability made a man abso-
lutely liable for injuries caused to others by members of his family,
by his servants, his animals or even by the inanimate things within
his property limits. By a process of rationalization the law began to
recognize excuses until under the test of Command or Assent the
master's liability was greatly limited, and, under the doctrine of
Particular Command, which appears in the cases during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, the tendency was to limit the master's lia-
bility to injuries caused by the very act commanded. "The doctrine
would require, in effect, that the master should be liable, (unlawful
errands apart) only when the deed in all its details had been expressly
and specifically commanded."' 2 Thus far the rationalizing process dis-
regarded the interests of the one injured and failed to take note of
any general social interest. Under Lord Holt a reaction,-a sort of
counter-rationalization--set in, which avowedly recognized that ques-
tions of masters' liability could not be resolved by the single test of
0 Jensen v. Fischer (1916) 134 Minn. 366, 159 N. W. 827. Linville v. Nis-
sen (1913) 162 N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096.
" (1920) 147 Minn. 106, 179 N. W. 681.
12 Wigmore: Tortious Responsibility. 3 Select Essays Anglo-American
Legal History.
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culpability of the master, and that the question properly involved
considerations of the relation between masters' liability and the con-
duct of business generally. This "counter-rationalization" of Lord
Holt, characterized by consideration of the interests of the injured
party as well as of broader social interests, has continued to the pres-
ent time. "The distinctions of today stand for an attempt (as yet
more or less incomplete) at a rationalized adjustment of legal rules
to considerations of fairness and social policy.' 13
It would seem that a judicial treatment of the problem of the vicari-
ous liability of the head of the family for the tortious act of a mem-
ber of the family while using the family automobile should aim "at a
rationalized adjustment of legal rules to considerations of fairness
and social policy." The rationalization of the rule of liability of the
head of the family has not at present proceeded further, however,
than that he is not liable for the tort of a member by reason of the
family relationship per se. Neither has the rationalization of the
rule of liability of the principal or master for the tortious acts of the
agent or servant delimited with any great degree of certainty and
accuracy the field within which vicarious liability will be imposed. In
the recent case of Nafli v. Peters14 the court said: "The liability for
the acts of another is not dependent upon the strict relationship of
master and servant, but upon relationship of similar nature, where
one acts for another, at his request, express or implied, for his benefit,
and under his direction." Between the case of strict master-servant
relation and the "act within the scope of employment" on the one
hand and the case of a tort committed by a member of a family
under circumstances entirely disconnected with any family interest,
on the other hand, there is a twilight zone in which are found the
family-automobile cases and many cases involving a relationship "sim-
ilar to" or "analogous to" cases of strict master-servant relation.
Granting that in the average family- automobile case the facts of a
strict agency do not exist, still it seems a very superficial conclusion
to deny the presence of any facts of legal significance, except the two
facts of ownership of the car and the family relationship. Surely the
court was not the victim of a pure delusion when it declared: "It
seems too plain for cavil that a father who furnishes a vehicle for the
customary conveyance of the members of his family makes their con-
veyance by that vehicle his affair, that is, his business, and any one
driving the vehicle for that purpose with his consent, express or im-
plied, whether a member of the family or another, is his agent. In
this there is no similitude to a lending of a machine to another for
such other's use and purpose, unconnected with the general purpose
for which the machine was owned and kept."' 5 And, as far as the
13 Wignmre ibid.
14 Court of Appeals of N. Y., Oct. 27, 1925, reported in 149 N. E. 343.
15 Birch v. Abererombie, (1913) 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 59.
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public generally is concerned, it must be accepted as a fact "that the
father, as owner of the automobile and as head of the family, can pre-
scribe the conditions upon which it may be run upon the roads and
streets, or he can forbid its use altogether."1 6 And there is the further
"fact of the parent furnishing an automobile for family use, with a
general authority, expressed or implied, that it may be used for the
pleasure, comfort and entertainment or outdoor recreation of members
of the family."'i
If the facts normally present in the family automobile cases create
a relation between the head of the family and the driver of the auto-
mobile which can reasonably be called "representative"; and if,
under the facts, it may be fairly said that "the son must be regarded
as in the father's employment, discharging the duty usually per-
formed by a slave, and, therefore must, for the purposes of this suit,
be regarded as his father's servant; "18 or if it can be reasonably said
that there is a "relationship of similar nature (i. e. to master-servant
relation) where the driver acts for the owner on his request, express
or implied, for his benefit, and under his direction," then it would
seem that the courts, in applying the family-purpose doctrine are
well within the spirit of the historical development of the doctrine of
respondeat superior. It is true that the courts have emphasized the
social and economic effects of a failure to impose liability on the owner
of the automobile, and this has led to the charge that they are arbi-
trarily declaring a master-servant relation in order to secure or avoid
certain social and economic results. But a fairer appraisal of the
situation would seem to be that the courts first find (to their own
satisfaction, at least,) the existence of a representative relation, suffi-
ciently characterized by the familiar features of the typical master-
servant relation, as to call for the application of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. They then do what the courts from the time of
Lord Holt have done,-set over against the hardship visited upon the
personally innocent "superior" the plight of the equally innocent
person who has suffered and then cast into the balance considerations
of a more or less general social and economic nature.
The family-purpose doctrine was before the Indiana Appellate court
in the case of Smith v. Weaver.19 In this case the plaintiff had been
injured by the alleged negligent driving of an automobile, driven by
the husband of the owner. The wife had purchased the car for the use
of the family and the accident had occurred while the husband was
'rKing v. Smith 140 Tenn. 225, 204 S. W. 296, L. R. A. 1918F 293.
17 Dissenting opinion in Arkin v. Page, supra note 3.
18.Lashbrook v. Patten, (1864) 1 Div. (Ky.) 317. In this case the vehicle
was a carriage drawn by a team of horses. Naturally the Kentucky Court
considered the family-purpose doctrine already a part of Kentucky law
when the question was presented in a family-automobile case. Stowe v.
Morris (1912) 147 Ky. 388, 144 S. W. 52, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 224.
19 (1919) 73 Ind. App. 350 124 N. E. 503.
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driving the car alone and for a special purpose of his own. The in-
structions given by the lower court adopted the family-purpose doc-
trine in full. There was a verdict for the plaintiff and on appeal the
case was reversed with instructions for a new trial, the court remark-
ing: "The case was tried on a wrong theory. The evidence wholly
fails to sustain the verdict." On the facts of the case it is not neces-
sarily authority for the rejection in toto of the family purpose doc-
trine, for it is possible that a future decision may make the distinction
which has been made by the New Jersey Court .of Errors and Appeals.20
At least it is to be hoped that some later decision will give the ques-
tion the thorough consideration which its importance deserves.
WALTER E. TREANOR.
Indiana University School of Itaw.
20 See Notes 5 and 6 supra.
